In this paper, we propose a mathematical model for an optimal hostage rescue problem, Suppose that a person is taken as a hostage and that a decision has to be made from among three alternatives: storm for rescue, wait up to the next point in time for an opportunity t o present itself or take an action of negotiation which might save the situation. Here, it is assumed that the action of negotiation can only be taken once and its effectiveness completely vanishes thereafter. The objective is t o find an optimal decision rule so as to maximize the probability of the hostage not being killed.
Introduction
Hostage events frequently occur in many places all over the world for different reasons. Typical examples in recent years include:
1. A 44-year-old, knife-wielding man, took a female receptionist hostage at the Kyoto bureau of NHK in Japan on January 18, 2002. He barricaded himself in the building and demanded to speak to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi by telephone. Police officers stormed the site after four and a half hours, rescued the hostage and arrested the man [4] .
2. Two Chechens hijacked a Russian airliner and enforced the flight with 167 passengers to land in the Saudi Arabian City of Medina on March 15, 2001. They demanded halting the genocide in Chechnya and sitting at the negotiating table to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Saudi security forces stormed the hijacked Russian plane the next day, freeing remaining hostages. However, three people -a flight attendant, a hijacker and a operation, together with taking into account the safety of hostages, the demands of the perpetrators, and the repercussions of success or failure in a rescue attempt, and so on. The purpose of this paper is to propose a mathematical model for an optimal hostage rescue problem by using the concept of a sequential stochastic decision process and examine the properties of an optimal rescuing rule.
Up to the present, the author has examined a model for solving the problem in [2] where two decision alternatives, storming for rescue or waiting up to the next point in time, were available. However, as seen in many hostage events, negotiators can take various actions to deal with the perpetrator(s); for example, persuading the perpetrator(s) to surrender by subjecting him to a relative's voice, or submitting to his demands to be flown to another country, or providing a means of escape, paying the ransom, releasing his comrades in prison, and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to include such an action of negotiation in our rescue decision, i.e., we should make a rescue decision from among three alternatives: storm for rescue, wait up to the next point in time, or take an action of negotiation. The author has already proposed a basic model in 131 where such an action of negotiation can only be taken once and its effectiveness lasts up to the deadline. In this new paper we propose another model where such an action of negotiation can only be taken once and its effectiveness completely vanishes thereafter.
Unfortunately, concerning hostage rescue problems, with the exception of the author's two papers [2] 131, we have been unable to find any reference material utilizing a mathematical approach.
Model
The process in the sequential decision problem dealt with in this paper is defined as discretetime model with a finite planning horizon. Let us number the points in time backward from the final point in time on the horizon, time 0, as 0, 1, . ., and so on. Further, let the time internal between two successive points, say times t and t -1, be called the period t . Here, we assume that storming for rescue is the only course of action at the deadline (time O), prompted by some reason, say, the hostage's health condition, the degree of the perpetrator(s) desperation, and so on.
In this model, we suppose that one person is taken as a hostage at any given point in time t , and a decision has to be made from among three alternatives: storm for rescue, wait up to the next point in time for an opportunity to present itself or take an action of negotiation which might save the situation. For simplicity, by S, W and A let us denote the above three decisions, respectively. Further, let us assume that the action of negotiation can only be taken once and it is effective only at that time, i.e., the effectiveness of the action of negotiation completely vanishes thereafter.
Suppose that the action of negotiation has not yet been taken up to time t. Let p (0 < p < 1) be the probability of the hostage being killed if the decision S is made, and let q and r (0 < q < 1, 0 <^ r < 1 and 0 < q + r < 1) be the probabilities of the hostage being, respectively, killed and released if the decision W is made; accordingly, 1 -q -r is the probability of the hostage being neither killed nor released; let A = 1 -q -r (0 < A < 1). Now, noting the fact that taking an action of negotiation will influence the probabilities q and r to a greater or lesser degree, in this model let us assume that if an action of negotiation is taken, then the q and r thus far change into q' and r', respectively, and that the q' and r' return again to q and r thereafter; let A' -= 1 -q' -r ' (0 < q' < 1, 0 r' < 1, and 0 < A ' < 1). Here, t h e c a s e s o f p = O , p = l , q = O , q = l , r = 1 , q ' = O , q ' = l , r l = l , The objective here is to find the optimal decision rule so as to maximize the probability of the hostage not being killed.
A.

Optimal Equation
Let S be the probability of the hostage not being killed at any time if the decision S is made. ( f l ) Suppose r/q :;Â r'/ql. Then, from (c) we have (f2) Suppose r/q < rl/q'. Then, it follows from vto = Ato that the assertion holds for t = t o . Suppose vt-1 = At-1 for t > t o . Then, noting (c) and Eq.(3.6), we obtain
i.e., At > Wt . Thus, vt -At for t > to from (b). Accordingly, q = A, for t > t o .
Analysis
In this section, we examine the properties of the optimal decision rule for the model, classifying combinations of the parameters, p, q, r , q' and r ' into the following three cases: which exclusively and exhaustively include all the combinations of the parameters. The three cases mean the following: Suppose that the process starts from time 1. Then, the cases 1, 2 and 3 imply that, storming for rescue, taking an action of negotiation and waiting up to the time 0 are optimal, respectively. 
Conc~usi~ns
Note that an action of negotiation has not yet been taken at time t when the hostage taking occurs. Accordinglyl by the definition of model, at that time t l it is sufficient to consider only ut. Once the action of negotiation is taken at a certain time t1 (tl 5 t ) , it is sufficient to consider only will for t" 5 t1 thereafter so long as the hostage is not released. Therefore, from Theorems 5.1. 5. Optimal Decision Rule 6.1. (a) ). Here) we will introduce the concept of myopic property used in later discussion.
In general, an optimal decision rule of a sequential decision process depends on time t . However, for some cases, the optimal decision becomes independent of time t although such cases are rare. In these cases, the optimal decision rule for any time t is the same as that for time 1. This implies that it is optimal to behave always as if only a single period of planning horizon remains; in other words) it is optimal to behave always as if the next point in time is the deadline. This property is usually called as the myopic property [I] . We may note that it is quite a singular property.
In this paper we adopt a definition of myopic property that differs from the conventional one mentioned above. By ' 7-let us denote a given set of time t for a specified optimal decision rule, if it is optimal to behave for all t E T as if only T periods remain up to the deadline, then let the optimal decision rule be said to be a T-myopic property on, 7 . Accordingly, it follows that the conventional definition of the myopic property is '1-myopic property on 7-= {1,2, * . *}>.
Now, in order to make the Optimal Decision Rule 6.1. more understandable, let us summarize it as in Table 1 . In the table, let DE-XT imply that DE-X is optimal for all t for which the statement lI' (referring to a time t when the hostage event occurs) is true. It should be noted in Table 1 that For a certain space of parameters, there exists at most one critical point in time at which the optimal decision changes from one to another. It is either 1 or t6. In order to demonstrate how to interpret the contents of the table, let us take one of the cells as example.
This implies that: when a hostage event occurs at time t , and the combination of p, q, r , q1 and r 1 satisfies such the condition that U > S, U > U1, A' > A and U < 6 < W 1 > we first calculate t6 by using Eqs.(4.1) and ( 5 . 3 ) . If 1 2 t 5 t 6 ) then DE-D is optimal and 1-myopic on [ I , t6] ; if t > t 6 , then DE-C is optimal and (t6 + 1)-myopic on [t6 + 1, t6 + 2,
-.).
As seen in Table 1 , the optimal decision rule of this model has the myopic property that we defined.
Taking different real hostage situations into account, we feel that there is a need to modify the model from the following viewpoints:
We should consider the case where the effectiveness of an action of negotiation decreases gradually after it was taken. In real hostage events, several acts of negotiation are available, in which the problem therefore arises as to when and what action of negotiation should be taken. The author examined the case with more than one hostage in [2] , which should be generalized by introducing simple or multiple actions of negotiation. In many real cases, the perpetrator(s) operate with confused motives. This causes the probabilities p, q, and r to change randomly from one minute to the next. This consideration leads us to the model in which p, q > r , q', and r1 are random variables with a known or unknown distribution function. When it is unknown, we can and must update its unknown parameters by using Bayes' theorem. 5. In many real cases, the deadline is not always definite; in other words, it should be regarded as a random variable. A model with this assumption should be examined in the future.
6. In order for our models to be more realistic and effective, the probabilities p, q, r , q' , and T' must be measured and known in advance for each hostage crisis. Although such a measurement would be a very difficult task, it should be tackled through the united efforts of researchers in dflerent fields, say, statisticians, psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, engineers, and so on.
